Post by account_disabled on May 2, 2024 0:13:06 GMT -5
We require that accepting the mediator services and reporting honestly to the mediator will form an ex post equilibrium which satisfies the following rationality condition an agent s payoff can’t be negative regardless of the actions taken by the agents who did not choose the mediator s services or by the agents who report false types to the mediator.
We prove the existence of such desired mediators for the next price Google like position auctions as well as for a richer class of position auctions including k price position auctions k . For k the self price position auction we show that the existence of a such mediator depends on the tie breaking rule used in the Heavy Construction Contractors Email List auction. On the Value of Correlation AUTHORS Itai Ashlagi Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz PUBLICATION Journal of Artificial Intelligence forthcoming ABSTRACT Correlated equilibrium Aumann generalizes Nash equilibrium to allow correlation devices.
Aumann showed an example of a game and of a correlated equilibrium in this game in which the agents surplus expected sum of payoffs is greater than their surplus in all mixed strategy equilibria. of anarchy literature Koutsoupias Papadimitriou Papadimitriou this suggests the study of two major measures for the value of correlation in a game with non negative payoffs the ratio between the maximal surplus obtained in a correlated equilibrium to the maximal surplus obtained in a mixed strategy equilibrium—we refer to this ratio as the mediation value and the ratio between the maximal surplus to the maximal surplus obtained in a correlated equilibrium—we refer to this ratio as the enforcement value. In this work we initiate the study of the mediation and enforcement values providing several general results on the value of correlation as captured by these concepts.
We prove the existence of such desired mediators for the next price Google like position auctions as well as for a richer class of position auctions including k price position auctions k . For k the self price position auction we show that the existence of a such mediator depends on the tie breaking rule used in the Heavy Construction Contractors Email List auction. On the Value of Correlation AUTHORS Itai Ashlagi Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz PUBLICATION Journal of Artificial Intelligence forthcoming ABSTRACT Correlated equilibrium Aumann generalizes Nash equilibrium to allow correlation devices.
Aumann showed an example of a game and of a correlated equilibrium in this game in which the agents surplus expected sum of payoffs is greater than their surplus in all mixed strategy equilibria. of anarchy literature Koutsoupias Papadimitriou Papadimitriou this suggests the study of two major measures for the value of correlation in a game with non negative payoffs the ratio between the maximal surplus obtained in a correlated equilibrium to the maximal surplus obtained in a mixed strategy equilibrium—we refer to this ratio as the mediation value and the ratio between the maximal surplus to the maximal surplus obtained in a correlated equilibrium—we refer to this ratio as the enforcement value. In this work we initiate the study of the mediation and enforcement values providing several general results on the value of correlation as captured by these concepts.